(Evensky, 2005, chapter 3). "
The difference between the genius of the British constitution which protects and governs North America, and that of the mercantile company which oppresses and domineers in the East Indies, cannot perhaps be better illustrated than by the different state of those countries" (Smith, 1784 (Smith, [1976a , p. 91). Bengal had many resources, but people enjoyed no security. The merchants ran the colony for their own short-term gain, extracting "great fortunes" from the colony by monopolizing access to capital and lending it "to the farmers at forty, fifty, and sixty per cent ... [so that] the succeeding crop is mortgaged for the payment" (p. 111).
In contrast, citizens in the British American colonies enjoyed the same system of justice as that which benefited the citizens of Great Britain. So notwithstanding the mercantile regulations that constrained the commerce of North American colonial farmers and merchants, the combination of liberty and justice that they enjoyed afforded them security and encouraged their fruitfulness (Smith, 1784 (Smith, [1976a , p. 540):
That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every man that he shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour, is alone sufficient to make any country flourish, notwithstanding these [mercantile impediments] and twenty other absurd regulations of commerce. ... The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often incumbers its operations .... In Great Britain [and in its American colonies] industry is perfectly secure; and though it is far from being perfectly free, it is as free or freer than in any other part of Europe.
Adam Smith completed two major works-The Theory of Moral Sentiments and
The Wealth of Nations. His Lectures on Jurisprudence were to be the basis of a third major work. Smith's analysis of the evolution of liberal market systems, positive law and civic ethics is not segmented among these presentations. Smith envisioned these dimensions of humankind as a simultaneous system within which progress along any one dimension requires complementary progress in the other two (Evensky, 2005 , chapters 3 and 4). Smith's analysis in The Wealth of Nations presumes a system of justice defined and enforced by positive law and civic ethics, but as Smith tells the story, the emergence of that mature system of justice is in turn dependent on humankind's material progress. Only with material progress is there a surplus sufficient to support a refined division of labor that includes courts of justice, standing armies to defend a nation of citizens engaged in commerce, and the philosophical reflection that informs institutional maturation.
Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence describe how positive law evolves to facilitate the emergence of liberal, free market society. However, Smith makes clear that this institutional maturation can only take societal progress so far. Positive laws are external constraints that must be imposed on individuals by a system of police. As society becomes more complex, if police must be the ultimate source of a society's security, the freedom that makes progress possible is crushed by the oppressive police state that makes that freedom secure. Ultimately, the cohesiveness and constructiveness of a liberal order depends, according to Smith, not on institutional government but on self-government, on the ethical maturity of the citizenry. "What institution of government," Smith (1790 Smith ( [1976b , p. 187) writes, "could tend so much to promote the happiness of mankind as the general prevalence of wisdom and virtue? All government is but an imperfect remedy for the deficiency of these. Whatever beauty, therefore, can belong to civil government upon account of its utility, must in a far superior degree belong to these." The emergence and maturation of civic ethics is the subject of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.
This essay describes Smith's analysis of ethics in his Theory of Moral Sentiments: the interaction of our nature and our nurturing that makes common civic ethics possible and the dynamic interaction of individuals and extant societal constructions that can lead to ever more mature systems of civic ethics and thus toward those conditions necessary for a constructive, sustainable liberal system.
On the Nature of Our Being and the Ties that Bind
According to Smith, a natural sense of fellow-feeling is the thread that weaves the social fabric together. The opening words of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790 [1976b] , p. 9) are "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others... ."
Human beings care and wonder about the feelings that fill the hearts of others. But our access to that which another feels is not direct. We are not capable of seeing into the hearts of others. Smith (1790 Smith ( [1976b Our imagination looks into the invisible recesses of another's heart through the window of that person's passions. Passions are the visible expression of another's sentiments, and sentiments are those "affection [s] of the heart, from which any action proceeds" (Smith, 1790 (Smith, [1976b , p. 18). Our sentiments, residing in the heart of our being, process experience and generate our passions-and in turn our actions. The strength of a passion is determined by the measure of the sentiment that evokes that passion. For example, one who sees another suffering and whose heart holds a large measure of the sentiment of beneficence (sometimes referred to as benevolence) will passionately desire to help that other and will act with great kindness.
As a spectator, when we observe in another both the passion and the circumstance that engenders it, we imagine the measure of the sentiment in that person's heart that transformed that circumstance into the passion we observe. Inevitably, as we do so we ask ourselves: Is that measure of sentiment appropriate? Does the cause-the circumstance-justify the strength of the effect-the passion? To the degree our answer is 'Yes," our sentiments are in harmony with those of the person we observe. That sense of harmony of sentiments is what Smith (1790 Smith ( [1976b , p. 9) refers to as "sympathy." To sympathize with another is to feel approval of his sentiments.
To the degree that we are in sympathy with the sentiments of another, that person enjoys our approbation. Where sympathy is lacking there is a "dissonance" (p. 16), which gives rise to "disapprobation."
If we hear a person loudly lamenting his misfortunes, which, however, upon bringing the case home to ourselves, we feel, can produce no such violent effect upon us, we are shocked at his grief; and, because we cannot enter into it, call it pusillanimity and weakness. ... In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion which the affection seems to bear to the cause or object which excites it, consists the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the consequent action (pp. 16, 18).
Thus, our sympathy is the standard by which we assess the propriety or impropriety of others' sentiments. And as we assess others, so, too, they assess us.
There is little at stake in this mutual assessment if neither of us has a particular relation or a vested (or in Smith's terms, "partial," p. 154) interest involved. However, Smith (1790 Smith ( [1976b , p. 21) writes:
With regard to those objects, which affect in a particular manner either ourselves or the person whose sentiments we judge of, it is at once more difficult to preserve this harmony and correspondence, and at the same time, vastly more important.... I can much more easily overlook the want of this correspondence of sentiments with regard to such indifferent objects as concern neither me nor my companion, than with regard to what interests me so much as the misfortune that has befallen me, or the injury that has been done me.
When my partial interest is involved, I keenly desire the sympathy of the spectator. I look to his fellow-feeling for validation, support and comfort. If, for example, someone injures me intentionally and unjustly, I look to the spectator for sympathy with my pain and my resentment.
But even as I look to the spectator for that sympathy, I understand that the spectator is not me, and so he cannot fully appreciate my position. The spectator can only imagine from a distance the sentiments that give rise to my passion, and so the spectator's sympathy is tempered by that distance that the imagination must bridge. Smith (1790 Smith ( [1976b In sum, as we judge others by our sense of harmony with what we imagine to be their sentiments, we know that they are doing the same in judging us. That judgment matters to us. We desire the harmony of others' sympathy with our sentiments. Thus, we naturally adjust our sentiments toward that measure that will enjoy their sympathy. This natural inclination to desire the sympathy of others and thus to seek a harmony of sentiments with them is the foundation of the social regulation of personal behavior.
On Moral Sentiments
Since sentiments are invisible but their expressions-the passions-are visible, Smith (1790 Smith ( [1976b ) establishes a general taxonomy of sentiments by examining the categories of passions we observe. These categories are: "the unsocial Passions" (p. 34), "the social Passions" (p. 38) and "the selfish Passions" (p. 40).
The unsocial passions are those of "hatred and resentment" (p. 34). They exist to protect us from injury at the hands of others, by making others wary of harming us for fear of exciting these passions. They are, according to Smith, the expression of an underlying sentiment that people have for justice.
When unregulated, these unsocial passions can be the most socially destructive of all passions. "There is no passion..,. concerning whose indulgence we ought so carefully to consult our natural sense of propriety, or so diligently to consider what will be the sentiments of the cool and impartial spectator" (p. 38). The impartial spectator will be sympathetic if and only if this passion reflects a properly measured sentiment ofjustice. "Too violent a propensity to those detestable passions, renders a person the object of universal dread and abhorrence, who, like a wild beast, ought, we think, to be hunted out of all civil society" (p. 40). Here we meet Smith's "impartial spectator," a spectator with no vested interest. This impartial observer, first as a real being and then as an abstract conception, is central to Smith Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment; because the mere want of beneficence tends to do no real positive evil....
There is, however, another virtue, of which the observance is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, and of which the violation exposes to resentment, and consequently to punishment. This virtue is justice: the violation of justice is injury: it does real and positive hurt to some particular persons.... One who does not display appropriate beneficence can be "the object of hatred" (p. 79). But only the absence of appropriate justice justifies resentment and its attendant just punishment, which is why Smith (p. 79) argues: "Resentment... is the safeguard ofjustice...."
With these words, the connection between moral sentiments and a liberal society begins to emerge. Police cannot be the ultimate source of justice, for a police state cannot be a liberal order. A liberal society can only be constructive and sustainable to the degree that the hearts of its citizens embody a properly measured sentiment ofjustice and regulate themselves by that measure. Thus, the sine qua non of a liberal society is moral sentiments. Between beneficence and justice, the one motivating our kindnesses to others and the other motivating our resentment of injury from others, is the sentiment of self-love. The selfish passions, "[g]rief and joy, when conceived upon account of our own private good or bad fortune" (Smith, 1790 (Smith, [1976b , p. 40) express the sentiment of self-love. As Smith (pp. 82-83) describes this sentiment:
Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and right that it should be so. Every man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other man: and to hear, perhaps, of the death of another person, with whom we have no particular connexion, will give us less concern, will spoil our stomach, or break our rest much less than a very insignificant disaster which has befallen ourselves.
As with justice and beneficence, self-love enjoys the sympathy of an impartial spectator if it is properly measured and balanced (Smith, 1790 (Smith, [1976b In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of. In Smith's analysis, proper balance is the key to moral sentiments, and the standard of proper balance is the sympathy of an impartial spectator. The ideal moral sentiments are therefore those that, in measure and balance, enjoy the complete sympathy of a perfectly informed and perfectly ethical impartial spectator. This idealized, abstract spectator knows both the contents of your heart and the ideal moral measure and balance of sentiments.
To know this standard would be a first step toward virtue, but to be virtuous one must also enforce this standard upon oneself. The enforcement mechanism is "self-command" (p. 24), "that command of the passions which subjects all the movements of our nature to what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct require .. " (p. 23) If one could make the imaginary leap into an ideal impartial spectator position and know the balance of sentiments consistent with perfect virtue, and if that individual had the self-command necessary to maintain that ideal balance in himself, then he could achieve Smith Smith describes humankind as having evolved through four progressively more complex and mature stages: hunting and gathering, pasturage, agriculture and, finally, commerce. As humankind progressed through these stages, ever more complex social and political institutions played an essential instrumental role in making that progress possible. They provided security when individuals' civic ethics did not; and by institutionalizing the progress of the past, these institutions served as a foundation for further progress.
Smith does not represent humankind's progress through these stages as an inexorable, linear improvement from the first to the last stage. Rather, the story he tells is of particular societies progressing, stagnating and declining; the emergence of new societal constructs followed by progress, then again stagnation and decline. The progress of humankind emerges from this process because among these societal experiments, more mature societies are, ceteris paribus, more capable of defending themselves. Thus, progress, in the large, is reinforcing (Evensky, 2005,  chapter 1) .
Institutions facilitate this progress, but, ultimately, the achievement of a constructive and sustainable liberal order of free people and free markets depends not on more mature institutions, but on the progressive maturation of societal norms of justice-and on the acceptance of and the adherence to these norms by the citizenry.
Establishing Social Order: The Development and Inculcation of Societal Norms
Justice is a sine qua non of the liberal plan for free people and free markets, for without justice there is no security and society degenerates into the Hobbesian war of all against all. Smith (1790 Smith ( [1976b , p. 85-86) argues:
All the members of human society stand in need of each others assistance, and are likewise exposed to mutual injuries. Where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes and is happy. All the different members of it are bound together by the agreeable bands of love and affection, and are, as it were, drawn to one common centre of mutual good offices.
But though the necessary assistance should not be afforded from such generous and disinterested motives, though among the different members of the society there should be no mutual love and affection, the society, though less happy and agreeable, will not necessarily be dissolved.... These general rules serve as a guide for our behavior when, in the heat of passion, the cool perspective of an impartial spectator is unavailable to us. Education and experience make the rules immediately accessible to us. Social concurrence with their content and social/legal sanction for their violation give these rules authority over us. We are not capable of perfection, but we are capable of the citizenship necessary for social cohesion, thanks to the capacity of our society to impress upon us general rules that can guide our behavior.
The coarse clay of which the bulk of mankind are formed, cannot be wrought up to such perfection. There is scarce any man, however, who by discipline, education, and example, may not be so impressed with a regard to general rules, as to act upon almost every occasion with tolerable decency, and through the whole of his life to avoid any considerable degree of blame. ... What different ideas are formed in different nations concerning the beauty of the human shape and countenance? A fair complexion is a shocking deformity upon the coast of Guinea. Thick lips and a flat nose are a beauty. In some nations long ears that hang down upon the shoulders are the objects of universal admiration. In China if a lady's foot is so large as to be fit to walk upon, she is regarded as a monster of ugliness. Some of the savage nations in North-America tie four boards round the heads of their children, and thus squeeze them, while the bones are tender and gristly, into a form that is almost perfectly square. Europeans are astonished at the absurd barbarity of this practice, to which some missionaries have imputed the singular stupidity of those nations among whom it prevails. But when they condemn those savages, they do not reflect that the ladies in Europe had, till within these very few years, been endeavouring, for near a century past, to squeeze the beautiful roundness of their natural shape into a square form of the same kind. And that, notwithstanding the many distortions and diseases which this practice was known to occasion, custom had rendered it agreeable among some of the most civilized nations which, perhaps, the world ever beheld. 
The Emergence of Ethical Autonomy and the Evolution of Civic Ethics
If change is at least in part intentional, how do individuals escape the confines of the "natural order" into which they are born in order to act on it?
Smith Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind.... This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct.
We pay careful attention to what we see in this looking-glass because we are social beings. We desire the approbation and abhor the disapprobation of those who make up our social frame (Smith, 1790 (Smith, [1976b , p. 112): "[O]ur first moral criticisms are exercised upon the characters and conduct of other people; and we are all very forward to observe how each of these affects us. But we soon learn, that other people are equally frank with regard to our own. We become anxious to know how far we deserve their censure or applause...."
But while the approbation of others is the first measure of our being, it is not the ultimate measure. Even when the real-world spectators who judge us are impartial, they cannot know our heart and the sentiments within it. In judging us, they must do so based on what "appears to be" (Smith, 1790 (Smith, [1976b , p. 67, emphasis in original), on what they see, not what is in our heart.5 "Unfortunately this moral looking-glass is not always a very good one" (Smith, 1759, p. 260).
5 Smith (1759, pp. 105-106) also makes the point that it is probably a good thing that we assess each other by actions, rather than pretending to have a direct window into the hearts of others: "If the hurtfulness of the design, if the malevolence of the affection, were alone the causes which excited our resentment, we should feel all the furies of that passion against any person in whose breast we suspected or believed such designs or affections were harboured, though they had never broke out into any action. Sentiments, thoughts, intentions, would become the objects of punishment; and if the indignation of mankind run as high against them as against actions; if the baseness of the thought which had given birth to no action, seemed in the eyes of the world as much to call aloud for vengeance as the baseness In contrast, when we attempt to take the position of an impartial spectator in order to assess our own behavior, we can know our own sentiments-but it takes a great effort to be impartial, for we always have a partial interest in our own circumstance.
This fundamental difference of perspective between societal judgment and self-judgment can lead to a dissonance when we feel that society has misjudged us with either excessive praise or blame (Smith, 1790 (Smith, [1976b , pp. 114, 115):
The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-worthiness.... As ignorant and groundless praise can give no solid joy, no satisfaction that will bear serious examination, so, on the contrary, it often gives real comfort to reflect, that though no praise should actually be bestowed upon us, our conduct, however, has been such as to deserve it....
This dissonance between society's judgment and our own self-judgment can in turn lead to the emergence of autonomy in moral assessment, making possible moral maturation. It is, after all, not the desire for praise or avoidance of blame from others that motivates real virtue, rather the pursuit of virtue is driven by the internal desire to be praiseworthy and the abhorrence of blameworthiness (Smith 1790 (Smith [1976b , pp. 116-117). Nature, when she formed man for society.., .endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved of. ......
[T]hough a wise man feels little pleasure from praise where he knows there is no praise-worthiness, he often feels the highest in doing what he knows to be praise-worthy, though he knows equally well that no praise is ever to be bestowed upon it.6
As we depend more on this internal assessment of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, we become more autonomous in our ethical judgments. Given this new perspective, when we take that imaginary step into an impartial spectator's position things begin to look different. We are invariably led to imagine not only what would be the socially acceptable response to the circumstance-what would be our duty and would follow custom--but also whether another response seems more of the action, every court ofjudicature would become a real inquisition. There would be no safety for the most innocent and circumspect conduct.... Actions, therefore, which either produce actual evil, or attempt to produce it, and thereby put us in the immediate fear of it, are by the Author of nature This monopoly has so much increased the number of some particular tribes of them, that, like an overgrown standing army, they have become formidable to the government, and upon many occasions intimidate the legislature. The member of parliament who supports every proposal for strengthening this monopoly, is sure to acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whose numbers and wealth render them of great importance. If he opposes them, on the contrary, and still more if he has authority enough to be able to thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest publick services can protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults, nor sometimes from real danger, arising from the insolent outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists.
Because of these powerful interests, Britain was burdened by what should have been a wonderful opportunity: the globalization of trade. The opening of the east and west gave Europe access to markets that spanned the globe. Since an expansion of the extent of the market is both a prerequisite for the ever-finer division of labor and an opportunity to generate the capital to finance those improvements, a new era of global trade for Europe could have been a great benefit, directly and indirectly, to all the nations of Europe. But while nominally meant to "enrich a great nation" (Smith, 1784 (Smith, [1976a , 627), the mercantile colonial policies were in fact "frequently more hurtful to the countries in favour of which they are established than to those against which they are established" (pp. 627-628):
After all the unjust attempts, therefore, of every country in Europe to engross to itself the whole advantages of the trade of its own colonies, no country has yet been able to engross to itself any thing but the expence of supporting in time of peace and of defending in time of war the oppressive authority which it assumes over them. 
